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arrangements -  since they  actually exist. 
The  upshot  of  this  is  that  the  validity  of 
Willhoite's  thesis  depends  upon  evidence  about 
what  humans  do  -  not  upon  evidence  about 
what  primates  do.  And  that  is  what  we  knew 
(or should have known)  in the first place. 
PHILLIP C. CHAPMAN 
University of Arizona 
To  THE EDITOR: 
Professor  Chapman's  first  criticism  is that  I 
illegitimately  equated  political  authority  with 
power,  stratification,  and dominance-deference 
relationships.  I'm  sorry  if  I  conveyed  that 
impression  to  any  reader;  I  certainly  did  not 
mean  to  use  "authority"  in  any  eccentric  way 
but  simply  as  power  or  hierarchical  relation- 
ships  considered  to  be  legitimate  or  rightful. 
Through my discussion  of "attention  structure" 
and "charisma," I was suggesting that hierarchy- 
forming  is  phylogenetically  rooted  in  the  hu- 
man  species  and  long  preceded  the  emergence 
of  hominids'  capacity  to distinguish symbolical- 
ly  between  legitimate  and illegitimate  power.  I 
would  further  suggest  that  we  often  tend  to 
accord  authority,  in  the  strict  sense,  to  those 
who  are in fact  our hierarchical superiors. It is 
also  possible,  of  course,  to  believe  that  one  is 
obliged  to  defer only  to those  to whom  one has 
initially  conceded  authority.  That  I  have  a 
strong  normative  preference  for  this  latter 
ordering  of  priorities  should  be  evident  from 
the  concluding  paragraphs of  my  article.  My 
principal  concern,  however,  was  to  outline  a 
phylogenetic  perspective  on  human hierarchies, 
the  behavioral  substructure  of  all  authority 
relationships. 
Professor  Chapman's  second  critical  point 
made  me  painfully  aware  that  I  had  used  the 
terms  "nature"  and  "natural"  equivocally  and 
had  thus  unintentionally  contributed  to  mis- 
leading  readers  about  my  meaning.  In  my 
central  thesis  statement  (p.  1 1 10),  I used  "by 
nature"  in  the  traditional  political  philosophic 
sense.  But  on  p.  1 124,  I  used  "natural"  in 
Robert  Bigelow's  evolutionary-biological  sense 
(as  typified  in  the  quote  by  him  on  pp. 
1125-1126).  I  wish  now  that  I  had  said 
"4phylogenetically"  instead  of  "by  nature"  in 
my  thesis  statement,  because,  as the remainder 
of  the  article makes clear, that is precisely what 
I  meant.  From  an  evolutionary-biological  per- 
spective  I would continue  to reject a dichotomy 
between  "natural"  and  "artificial"  in  human 
behavior.  Rather,  the  significant  question  is the 
degree  to  which  specific  types  of  behavior are 
constrained  or  channeled  phylogenetically. 
From  this standpoint,  then,  used car salesmen's 
apparel choices  are perfectly  "natural" but very 
likely  free  of  any  significant  degree of  genetic 
control.  I  continue  to  believe  that  there  are 
persuasive reasons  for  giving serious  considera- 
tion  to  my  basic hypothesis:  the  propensity  to 
form  hierarchies  is not  only,  in the  descriptive 
sense,  "natural"  to  humans,  but  has also been 
strongly  selected  for in  the  phylogenesis  of our 
primate species. 
FRED  H.  WILLHOITE, JR. 
Coe College 
Politicians  in Uniform 
TO THE EDITOR: 
The  recent  article  by  Robert  Jackman 
("Politicians  in Uniform:  Military Governments 
and Social  Change in the  Third World," APSR, 
70  [December,  1976]  1078-1097)  attempts  to 
resolve the question  of the relationship  between 
military  governance and social change. The core 
of  Jackman's  argument  is  a reconstruction  of 
Nordlinger's  "Soldiers  in  Mufti,"  (APSR,  64 
[December,  1970]  1131-1148).  Jackman iden- 
tifies  important  limitations  in Nordlinger's tests 
of  various hypotheses  concerning  the effects  of 
military  rule  and  attempts  to  improve  Nord- 
linger's  work  by  using  covariance  analysis.  We 
think,  however, that Nordlinger made a number 
of  errors  which  Jackman  repeats,  albeit  in  a 
slightly  different  form.  More importantly,  we 
believe  that Jackman's article illustrates a major 
pitfall  in  the  empirical  literature  on  policy 
outputs,  i.e.,  the  danger of  analyzing  political 
economy  problems  without  giving  careful 
thought  to their nonpolitical  dimensions. 
Jackman  correctly  identifies  major errors in 
Nordlinger's  article,  including  the  misspecifica- 
tion  inherent  in  zero-order correlations and the 
indeterminateness  of  the  direction  of  causality 
which  results  when  the  dependent  variable 
(social  change)  occurs  before  the  independent 
variable  (military  involvement)!  Jackman  is 
right  to  correct  these  errors, but  they  do  not 
exhaust the difficulties  in Nordlinger's piece. 
One of the primary problems of Nordlinger's 
analysis is the  high  probability  of measurement 
error. Nordlinger  measured  the  effects  of  mili- 
tary  involvement  on  seven  different  indicators 
(most  coming  from  Adelman  and  Morris's 
Society,  Politics  and  Economic  Development), 
including  such  items  as  "leadership  commit- 
ment  to  economic  development,"  "rate  of 
improvement  of  human  resources,"  "change in 
the  effectiveness  of the tax system,"  "change in 
the  rate  of  gross  investment,"  and  "rate  of 
growth  of GNP per capita."  "Control" variables 
included  the  size  of  the  middle  class  and  the 
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degree  of  "modernization  of  its  outlook." 
Whether  such  a  concept  as  "leadership  com- 
mitment  to  economic  development"  makes any 
sense  we're  not  sure,  but  in  a situation  where 
lending  agencies  like  the  International  Mone- 
tary Fund  and the World Bank require a plan as 
a precondition  for  aid,  it  is  hopeless  to  think 
that  the  existence  of a plan indicates  the extent 
of  such a commitment.  Moreover, even were we 
to  accept  to  validity  of  this measure, it still has 
problems.  As  defined  it  does  not  appear  to 
represent  any kind of scale, and even if it did, it 
would  have but  three levels,  thereby  engender- 
ing problems of limited variation. 
Similar  problems  arise  with  Nordlinger's 
second  index  of  economic  development.  Can 
one  talk  about  the  modern  outlook  of  social 
classes?  Adelman  and  Morris's category  of  the 
most  "modernized"  middle  class included  such 
countries  as  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Greece, 
Rhodesia,  South  Africa,  Taiwan  and Uruguay. 
Perhaps the  middle  class is just  fickle;  perhaps 
the  concept  makes little  sense in the first place. 
Moreover,  even  a  cursory  reading  of  Nord- 
linger's index  reveals that  it measures much the 
same thing as the dependent  variables of several 
of  the  equations.  This  may  account  for  the 
more  frequently  significant  t-coefficients  and 
the  higher R2 's in Table  1 and 2 than elsewhere 
in  the  article.  By adopting  Nordlinger's  choice 
of  variables, even  while  changing his specifica- 
tion,  Jackman  is  thus  vulnerable  to  major 
errors. 
Let  us now  consider  Jackman's  own  model. 
He specifies  the problem to be explained  as one 
of  "social  change"  and  utilizes  four indicators 
of that concept:  change in per capita energy use 
(a  proxy  for  economic  growth),  change in the 
ratio  of  school  enrollment  to  population, 
change in the number of doctors  per capita, and 
change  in  the  number  of  radios  per  capita. 
These  four indicators  are largely  unrelated  (see 
Table  5).  As  separate  concepts,  this  would  be 
fine,  but  since  they  are supposed  to  be  mea- 
sures of a single concept,  their near-orthogonali- 
ty  raises major questions.  How  are we to know 
that  the  indicators  are  measuring  the  same 
thing?  Perhaps there  is  no  concept  here at all. 
We agree with  Professor Jackman that these are 
interesting  variables  in  themselves,  but  we 
disagree with  his apparent belief  that he has got 
around  the  problem  of  multidimensionality  by 
applying  the  same  explanatory  model  to  each 
variable.  That  this  approach  is  unsuccessful  is 
most  evident  in  the  results:  R2's  that  average 
.196  with  one  control  variable and  .211  with 
the  other.  In  the  presence  of  evidence  of 
misspecification  of  this  magnitude,  nothing  can 
be  concluded  about  the  slopes  of  the  included 
variables.  In  other  words,  the  effect  of  the 
military's  involvement  in  politics  cannot  be 
determined  in these models. 
While Jackman may  have corrected  some  of 
Nordlinger's  problems,  he  thus did not  correct 
all  of  them.  Problems  of  measurement,  con- 
tamination,  and  specification  clearly  remain. 
These  problems  are solvable  in principle,  but it 
is our conviction  that Nordlinger's problems lay 
deeper than Jackman recognized  and that this is 
his ultimate  undoing.  More importantly,  it is at 
this  point  that  the  fundamental  problems  that 
bedevil  this  particular  article  can  be  seen  to 
underlie  much  of  the  broader  literature  on 
policy  outputs.  Nordlinger's  dependent  vari- 
ables include some that are directly controllable 
by  the  government  (like  the  tax  system),  some 
that  are  partially  controllable  by  the  govern- 
ment  (like  the  rate  of  gross  investment),  and 
some  which  the  government  influences  much 
less,  even  if  it  adopts  "appropriate" policies. 
The  presence  of  these  different  kinds of depen- 
dent  variables  has  important  implications  for 
this kind of work. 
One  consequence  of  recognizing  these  dis- 
tinctions  is that  we should  shy  away  from  any 
analysis that  uses the  same set  of  variables and 
the  same  mathematical  form  to  account  for 
variations  in different  kinds  of  dependent  vari- 
ables.  Not  only  is  the  government  differently 
related  to  each  kind  of  indicator,  but  some 
indicators  may  logically  precede  others  and 
may,  in  fact,  be  parameters  in  a  model  deter- 
mining  others.  Gross  investment  rates,  for 
example,  may  depend  on  the  tax system,  while 
per capita GNP growth depends, at least in part, 
on  the  gross  investment  rate.  Minimally  one 
might  conclude  that  identical  models  of  these 
phenomena  are inappropriate. 
Suppose  we  want  to  examine  the  effect  of 
government  policy  on agricultural productivity. 
We might consider such factors as the incentives 
to  invest  in  new  agricultural  technologies,  the 
domestic  terms  of  trade  between  agriculture 
and  industry,  the  international  terms  of  trade 
and  the  relative  price  advantage  thereby  given 
to  domestic  agricultural  producers,  the  struc- 
ture  of  land  law,  and  the  efficiency  of  the 
transportation  network.  All these clearly have a 
considerable  bearing  on  the  rate  of  growth  of 
agricultural  productivity,  and  they  might  well 
be included  in any regression model. 
A very different  model  would be appropriate 
to  explain  change  in  school  enrollment  ratios. 
Such  a model  might  include lagged measures of 
public  expenditures  on  education,  the  previous 
level  of  enrollments  (including  the  colonial 
heritage),  population  density  and  the  number 
of  languages spoken  (which  affect  costs).  Worth 
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noting,  however,  is that governments  seeking to 
speed  social  change might  choose  not  to  spend 
money  to accelerate enrollments,  either because 
they  already  have  a school-leavers  problem,  or 
because  it might be cheaper to educate  students 
abroad,  or because  the  private return to educa- 
tion  is  sufficiently  high  relative  to  the  social 
return  that  subsidies  are economically  unpro- 
ductive. 
Modeling  these  kinds  of  outcomes  seems 
relatively  easy  compared  to  modelling  changes 
in  per  capita  product,  partly  because  the 
underlying  structure  appears  to  be  more  obvi- 
ous,  and  partly  because  some  of  these  in- 
dicators  are  themselves  logically  precedent  to 
other  kinds  of  change.  (There  is, of course, the 
complication  that  changes in school  enrollment 
ratios,  for  example,  may  depend  on  economic 
growth,  but  in  such  a  model  economic  re- 
sources can be taken as a parameter.) 
Perhaps  this  argument  sounds  so  involved 
that  crunching  ahead is the  only  alternative  to 
giving up the  whole  affair. We think not,  and it 
seems  to  us  that  our earlier distinction  indeed 
offers  a simplifying  key  to  the  problem.  First, 
one  should  separate results of (1)  direct govern- 
ment  activities  like  changing the  tax structure, 
allocating  public  funds,  or  repressing and  tor- 
turing;  from  (2)  partially  controllable  results 
like  increasing  school  enrollments  and  raising 
gross  investment;  and  from  (3)  ultimate  out- 
comes  like  changing  GNP,  reducing  the  Gini 
coefficient,  or  increasing  the  population's 
caloric intake.  Immediately  we see that in order 
to  affect  ultimate  outcomes,  directly  control- 
lable activities  must vary. So  we  can start with 
these  direct and more easily modelable  policies: 
public spending, taxation,  repression. If they  do 
not  vary  according  to  the  degree  of  military 
involvement,  the  problem  is  resolved  right 
there.  If  they  do,  then  we  must  move  to  the 
next  (less  controllable)  activity,  always  model- 
ing with a plausible specification. 
Such  an  approach  raises  the  question  of 
whether  we  can  expect  government  policy  to 
have  much  of  an  effect  on  ultimate  economic 
outcomes.  Put  another  way,  is it  credible  that 
policy  instruments  represent  real  control  vari- 
ables  in  determining  the  behavior  of  the  de- 
pendent  variables?  A  negative  answer  to  this 
question  may,  in  fact,  be  plausible.  The  1973 
rise  in the  U.S.  agricultural prices had more  to 
do  with  Russia's  decision  to  enter  the  world 
market than it did with U.S. agricultural policy, 
whatever  our feelings  about  Butz's  response  to 
this  fact.  And  much  of  the  third  world's 
development  in  the  early  1950s  resulted  not 
from the domestic  policies  of their governments 
but rather from  the rapid expansion  of demand 
for primary products resulting from the Korean 
War. The importance  of these arguments can be 
seen  in Jackman's null  finding.  Methodological 
caveats  aside,  is  this  result  to  be  taken  as 
showing  that  military  governments  in  fact  do 
not  differ  from  civilian regimes in  their policy 
outcomes?  Or does it  simply  mean that govern- 
ment  policy  in  general  does  not  have  much 
influence  over the phenomena  of concern? 
In  sum,  we  wish  to  emphasize  that  the 
technical  features of  a  complex  analysis  are 
significant  and pose  difficult  problems,  but the 
deeper  problem  is  the  danger  of  modeling 
complex  political-economic  relationships  with- 
out  giving primary attention  to their distinctive 
structures. 
BARRY  AMES 
Washington University, St. Louis 
Visiting Scholar, Stanford  University 
ROBERT H.  BATES 
California Institute  of  Technology 
Visiting Scholar, Stanford  University 
TO THE EDITOR: 
Ames  and  Bates  voice  a series  of  muddled 
complaints  with  my  paper.  None  of  these 
complaints  is relevant to  my  analysis,  most  are 
unoriginal, and some are quite silly. 
The major objection  appears to be that I did 
not  give  careful  thought  to  the  "nonpolitical 
dimensions"  of  "political  economy  problems." 
(I  assume  that  this  is  intended  to  be  my 
"principal  undoing"  rather  than  Nordlinger's.) 
This  complaint  is  not  without  its  logical  and 
semantic  difficulties:  if  non-political  issues are 
the  key  to  a  problem,  in  what  sense  can that 
problem  meaningfully  be labeled  one  of  politi- 
cal  economy?  More  puzzling,  however,  is  the 
very restrictive  definition  of "political"  implied 
in their assertion  (nowhere  do Ames  and  Bates 
provide an explicit  definition).  Toward the end 
of  their  remarks,  political  is  taken  to  refer to 
"controllable  activities."  Thus,  "direct govern- 
ment  activities"  like  allocating  public funds are 
"political";  "partially  controllable  results 
[sic]"  such  as  increasing  school  enrollment 
ratios  are  (presumably)  semipolitical;  while 
"ultimate  outcomes"  like  altering  the  size 
distribution  of  income  are "nonpolitical."  This 
implied  definition  is too  restrictive to be useful, 
and fits  poorly  with the thrust of most political 
economy.  For example,  it is naive to assert that 
the  size  distribution  of  income  is nonpolitical, 
but  Ames  and Bates cannot  be  prevented  from 
making that assertion for this reason alone. 
Ames  and  Bates  have  had  some  difficulty 
representing  what  my  analysis  was  all  about. 
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